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THE MISHAP
On March 8, 1985, in high bay 2 of the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF)
at the Kennedy Space Center, technicians were preparing the space shuttle
orbiter Discovery for rollout to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). A
service platform, _nly referred to as an "OPF Bucket" was being retracted
when it suddenly fell, striking a technician and impacting Discovery's pay-
load bay door. A critical component in the OPF Bucket hoist system had
failed, allowing the platform to fall. The incident was thoroughly investi-
gated by both NASA and Lockheed Space Operations Co., revealing many design
deficiencies within the system. This paper reviews the deficiencies and the
design changes made to correct them. See Figures 1-14.
THE MECHANISM
The OPF Bucket system, Figures 1 & 2, consists of a pair of work
platforms, telescoping tube assemblies, hoisting systems, and trolleys, both
suspended from a cc_n overhead bridge. Each orbiter payload bay may be
accessed by two separate bridges, for a total of four Buckets per
high bay.
THE WORK PLATFOI_4 is made of aluminum, with a work area of 1 x 3 meters.
A tec]_-ic_ located in the Bucket has a hand operated rotation device with
which he may rotate the Bucket one to tv_ full revolutions. The
first production set of OPF Buckets uses a chain drive system that allows
the Bucket to rotate two revolutions but: requires locking the Bucket
into position after rotation. A later set of OPF Buckets uses a worm gear
drive device which is self locking but rotates only one revolution. At
the time of the mishap the Buckets had a rated capacity of 225 kg and were
connected to the hoisting system thru the rotation device. An electrical
control station, Figure 3, is available in the Bucket which controls the
direction (up/dc_zn, east/west, and forward/aft) and speed (3 meters/min, and
1 meter/min. ) of the Bucket motion drives.
THE TELESCOPING TUBE ASSemBLY consists of four nested square steel
tubes _ch 2.75 meters long allowing the Bucket to lower 6 meters into the
orbiter payload bay. The telescoping tubes carry torsional loads preventing
the Bucket from rotating in the horizontal plane and carry bending moments
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preventing eccentric loads from tipping the Bucket in the vertical plane.
The tubes do not provide vertical support. The smallest of the tubes is 250
mm square and connected at its bottom to the Bucket thru the rotation
device, the upper end of the tube has a travel stop which engages
intermediate tubes above it. The two intermediate tubes, one 300 mm and
the other 350 mm square, have bronze guides and travel stops which engage
their adjacent tubes. The fixed upper tube is 400 ma square and is directly
connected to the trolley chassis.
THE _3ISTING SYST_4, Figure 4 & 7, raises, lowers and provides vertical
support for the Bu(_e£--and telescoping tubes. A two part reeved, dual wire
rope hoist system using a cc_rcial, off the shelf, wall r_unted, 1350 kg
capacity, AC electric hoist is used.
At the heart of the system is the hoist which has full depth, 20 degree
involute, modified tooth fona, straight spur gears, machined integrally with
or splined to their shafts. The modified tooth form allows high addendum,
small pitch diameter pinions, with higher strength teeth, to be used with
low addendum gears more closely matching gear and pinion tooth strength and
preventing undercutting of the pinion teeth. The hoist has an electrical
solenoid operated drum type holding brake attached to its motor and an
automatic Weston screw-and-disc type load brake mounted between the first
and second gear reductions in the gearbox, Figure 5. The Weston load brake
holds the load regardless of whether the power is on or off. When lowering
the load the motor applies torque to the load brake causing the disc to
unscrew and thus slip, allowing the load to lower. When raising, the motor
causes the disc assembly to screw together, tightening the assembly. A
ratchet pawl engages a ratchet on the disc preventing the load from
backdriving when stationary.
The hoist is mounted to the outside of the fixed 400 nln upper tube and
has two i0 mm stainless steel wire ropes anchored to its drum. The
wire ropes pass through an upper snatchblock attached to the top of the fixed
tube and, at the time of the mishap, routed down thru the telescoping tubes
to a lower snatchblock attached to the Bucket rotation device. The rope is
routed through the lower snatchblock terminating at the upper end of the fixed
tube. With the two part reeving the hoisting system has a rated lifting
capacity of 2700 kg.
THE TROLLEY provides support and east/west motion capability for the
Bucket---and telescoping tubes. It is a steel frame chassis with a
ccmmercial, underhung, four wheel trolley unit at each corner of the
frame. Two of the wheeled trolley units have electric drive motors and
geared drive wheels.
THE BRIDGE is a steel truss which supports two trolley/Bucket
ass_es _ provides the forward/aft motion capability of the system.
The electric drive motor and gear box are centrally located on top of the
truss, connected to drive shafts running to each end of the truss; chain
drives connect the drive shafts to the drive wheels, Figure 6. The
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bridge also has a control station that _n control hoist, trolley and bridge
drives for each bucket.
THECAUSEOFTHEMISHAP
The direct cause of the mishapwas a failure of a hoist system master
link, Figure 7, allowing the bucket to fall, Figure 8. The master link
attached the lower snatchblock to the Bucket and was probably broken by
locking up the Bucket's vertical hoisting system. The locking up resulted
from the Bucket being raised until the telescoping tubes had reached their
upper travel limit and were physically prevented from further motion. The
hoist continued to drive applying an increasingly large force to the lower
snatchblockandmaster link assemblycausing the master link to break. An
electrical limit switch designed to shut off power to the hoist prior tothe
tubes reaching their upper travel limit had beenmisadjustedand did not
engage, Figure 9. The hoist system was designed to have redundant wire
ropes, lower snatchblocks and master liras loaded in parallel.
An earlier failure of one of the master links had occurred at which time
the Bucket was removed from service and "Do Not Operate" tags were attached to
theBucket control stations. The mishap occurred upon failure of the second
master link after the Bucket was tagged out. The primary cause of the
mishap was attributed to operator error due to unauthorized use of the
tagged out Bucket.
Investigation byNASA, Lockheed Space Operations Co., and a Lockheed
Corp. protection consultant revealedmanydesign related deficiencies with
the OPF Bucket's hoisting and position_Igmechanis_s. These deficiencies
were significant and if not correctedi_)uld have probably lead to another
mishap. Below is a sun_ary of these deficiencies.
i. The OPF Bucket system lacked a mechanical lock that would support
the system and prevent its inadvertent use.
2. The system lacked an operational up travel stop switch thus allowing
the Bucket operator to use the limit switch as an the operational stop. The
system lacked any device that would indicate a failure of the limit switch.
3. The system was not provided with an overload protection device.
4. Main load carrying ccmponents were inaccessible and could not be
readily inspected.
5. The electrical control system operated differently for the first
production set of 0PF Buckets than it did for the second production set.
6. The design of the control station switches would cause them to stick
in the energized position after repeated use.
7. There were no visual aids to help the operator determine when he was
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approaching the end of travel of the hoist system.
8. Inadequate clearance existed between the bottom of the OPF Bucket
and the orbiter payload bay doors when the doors were being closed. This
required the operator to retract the Buckets until the limit switch was
reached.
9. The load capacity limit for the OPF Bucket was inadequate to support _
normal operations.
i0. The master link failed at less than its rated capacity.
ii. Other hoist system overload modes existed such as telescoping tubes
which could bind then release and fall causing impact loads to the system.
Bucket handrails could bottom out on other structures during retraction if
the Bucket was not rotated to the proper orientation.
12. Downward overtravel could cause the hoist wire rope to rewind in
the opposite direction on the hoist drum and cause the hoist load brake to
be ineffective.
THE NEWDESIGN
Personnel and flight vehicle safety was the primary concern in the
redesign effort. The design changes to correct the deficiencies in the
system were not limited solely to beefing up the failed components but
included a wide scope of changes including: improved maintenance
capabilities, improved operation, increased load carrying capacities,
electrical control reliability and safety enhancements. I_rovement in
reliability and the elimination of single failure points were also main
goals of the redesign.
A review of OSHA and ANSI specifications revealed that there were no
government or industrial standards for this particular type lifting
mechanism. There were specifications for similar devices, however, such as
exterior building maintenance platforms, typically used bypainters and
window washers for access to the outside of buildings. These specifications
required that the platforms be maintained in a horizontal position with the
failure of one of the hoisting ropes, that minimum safety factors of I0:i be
provided on the hoisting systemand that the systemhave no single failure
points. The new designwould ccmply with the intent of these
specifications.
INTERIM CHANGES were made _iately following the mishap to prevent a
recurrence Of the failure and allow returning the Buckets to service under
restricted use. The changes included:
i. Redundant limit switches were installed at the upper end of the
telescoping tubes. The switches were placed in series with the first switch
located 45 mm below the physical upper travel limit and the second located
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25 mm belc_ the limit. The switches were also reoriented to eliminate the
misalignment problem which contributed to the mishap. The change in
alignment can be seen in Figures 9 & 13.
2. Visual aid stripes were painted on the telescoping tubes. The
stripes are visible to the operator and when aligned indicate that the
travel limit is being approached.
3. Inspection holes were cut in the lower end of the 250 nln telescoping
tube allowing easy access and inspection of the master links and
snatchblocks.
PERMANENT MODIFICATIONS were made to the system after cc_pletion of the
mishap investigations that were intended to correct the design deficiencies
identified by the various mishap investigation ccrm_ttees. An extensive
failure modes and effects analysis was performed which identified system
single failure points, latent failure points and hazards which were
corrected where possible. Latent failure points, such as a failed-closed
upper limit switch, are failure points in redundant syst_ns in which the
failure would be undetectable during normal use. These points were required
to be inspected on a periodic basis if they could not be removed by design.
The inspection requirement assured that if any failures occurred they would
not go long undetected.
The importance of operator and user involvement in the redesign effort
cannot be overemphasized. A key element in the redesign effort was the use of
interviews by the design engineers with the Bucket operators. The operators
knew the system well and had valuable information on how the system should
be configured to suit their needs.
Inspection of the telescoping tube travel stops revealed damage caused
by the tubes binding then working loose, freefalling and impacting the
stops. Methods to individually drive each tube with jackscrews or wire
ropes were rejected as being difficult to control and requiring too much
space. It was decided that a method to control the fall of the tubes would
be more practicable. The tubes if they should hang up would be allowed to
fall but the descent velocity of the fall would be limited.
The selection of the descent control device involved trade off studies
of different concepts including hydraulic cylinders and centrifugal brake
type devices. The hydraulic cylinder concept appeared initially to be the
most prcmising since the descent velocity could be controlled simply by
selecting the correct size orifice for each size telescoping tube and the
orifice size could be varied with ease. Problems with differing hydraulic
fluid volumes between the downstroke and upstroke and concerns with the
possibility of contaminating Space Shuttle payloads with leaking hydraulic
fluid led to the rejection of the hyftraulic cylinders as decent control
devices.
The system finally selected was a cfmmercial load control brake which
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is actually a personnel escape device used by construction workers to jump
off buildings in emergency situations. The device has an internal
centrifugal brake that will limit angular velocity similar to the rotary
dial in a dial type telephone forced in the counterclockwise direction. The
load control brake is attached to the trolley chassis with an 8 nln wire rope
routed down through a pulley on the telescoping tube, and back up to
temainate at the trolley chassis, Figure I0.
A load sensing device, Figures ii & 12, was installed that would sense
high or low hoist loads and shut off power to the system. A load equalizing
bar was also installed to maintain equal loading of the i0 ma wire ropes.
The hoisting system ccmponents, Figure ii & 13, were repositioned to
allow access for inspection of the wire ropes and wire rope pulleys. The
lower snatchblock and master link assembly were eliminated.
To prevent inadvertent operation of one Bucket by an adjacent Bucket
operator the control system circuitry was reconfigured. The Buckets in both
OPF high bays were made to operate identically.
A study of the hoist revealed that the load control brake ratchet pawl
stop, item 34 in Figure 5, a hex head screw, was located adjacent to the
gearbox oil drain plug, item 33 in Figure 5. The two could be easily
confused and inadvertent removal of the brake ratchet pawl stop would cause
the brake to become nonfunctional. Labels were attached to the drain plug
and the ratchet pawl stop bolt was sealed to the gearbox case.
Shunt trip circuit breakers were installed and mounted in a locked
cabinet. Once tripped the circuit breakers cannot be reset without
unlocking the cabinet. The circuit breakers are wired to the upper limit
switches and to the load sensing switch. A tripped circuit breaker will
indicate that there is problem with the system and that inspection or
repairs are required.
Concepts are now under study to eliminate single failure points in the
gear train of the ccn_ercial hoist. Concepts being considered are replacing
the existing hoist with a cc_rcial hoist that has no single failure
points, installing a brake on the drum of the existing hoist or installing
an inertia reel type load brake between the Bucket and the support
structure. Control systems for telescoping tubes which could be used in
lieu of the descent control devices are being investigated. Results of
these studies are expected by the second or third quarter of 1988.
TESTING
Tests were conducted to verify that the load control brake used to
control the descent of a falling telescoping tube would function correctly,
and, that the hoist system components breaking strength %_s as assumed.
To test the load control brakes a full scale simulator, Figure 14, was
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built to simulate the 350 mm telescoping tube and trolley chassis. Load
cells were installed at the four corners of the trolley chassis, where the
wheeled trolley units are located, to measure trolley loads and at the load
brake wire rope termination to measure load brake loads. A linear
transducer, "fish reel pot" was installed at the bottom of the telescoping
tube to measure displacement and vel_.ity. The telescoping tube was allowed
to freefall with the load control brake connected and the loads at the
trolley measured during impact of the tube travel stop. All load control
brakes are qualification tested in this manner prior to installation on an
OPF Bucket.
A failure test of the wire rope pulleys, Figure 13, and load limiting
switch assembly, Figure 12, was conducted to verify that the manufacturers
rated breaking strength was valid for the configuration in which they were
being used. The test results confirmed that the weak link in the system was
not the wire rope, which was analyzed as the weakest element, but the
load limiting switch. The switch failed at 95% of its rated breaking
strength. The test did confirm that adequate safety factors were provided
for the system.
CONCLUSIONS
There are many lessons to be learned from the OPF Bucket failure, the
most important of which is that equipment can be misused and probably will
be if it does not meet the needs of its user. Design engineers must solicit
the opinions and needs of thepeople who will use and operate the mechanisms
that they design.
Latent failure points should be identified and dealt with, a failure in
a redundant system that goes undetected in turn creates a single failure
point. Often a latent failure pointmaybeworse than a single failure
point because it may instill a false sense of security in the system.
The failure of the master link at less than its specified breaking
strength is an example of a manufacturer's desire to get the most from his
product. In this case the rated breaking strength was based on unpublished
test conditions. These conditions were not only omitted from his catalog
and engineering design manuals, but were not even co,non knowledge of his
engineers. When critical systems are involved it pays to test the
ccmponents to determine their limitations.
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